consumers place on lemon protection. This article examines that value by estimating the value to the marginal consumer of a lemon protection plan that was privately supplied by a U.S. automobile manufacturer.
Consumers value lemon insurance if it lowers the expected full price of purchasing an automobile. The expected full price of purchasing the services of an automobile includes not only its acquisition price but also the expected maintenance and operating costs. The value of lemon insurance to a consumer is directly related to (1) the amount by which the lemon insurance reduces the probability of ending up with a lemon and (2) the increase in maintenance and operating costs incurred if the product turns out to be a lemon. Thus, the dollar amount by which a given lemon insurance policy reduces the expected full price is a measure of the expected value to the marginal consumer of the lemon protection provided by that policy.
In 1980 the Chrysler Corporation instituted a program that was unusual in the context of American automobile retailing-a "buy-back" plan.4
The buy-back program allowed consumers to return their new car for a full refund within thirty days of purchase. The Chrysler buy-back program provided a unique opportunity to measure the consumer's perceived benefit of lemon insurance. Although the term of Chrysler's "buy-back" policy was limited, a money-back guarantee certainly provides consumers some degree of lemon protection. Using the limited data that are publicly available, this article estimates the value of the lemon insurance provided by Chrysler's thirty-day buy-back offer and then uses the estimated value of this thirty-day buy-back plan to examine the value of the one-year buyback coverage supplied by state lemon laws.
II. METHODOLOGICAL PRELIMINARIES
The full price of an automobile (P) can be expressed as the sum of the automobile's acquisition price (V) and the cost of operating and maintaining the automobile (M), which itself depends on factors including the size of the car and whether or not the car is a "lemon":5
Within a particular size category of automobile (that is, compact, intermediate, or full size), the automobile's full price can be expressed more simply as P = V + M+ ML if the car is a lemon, 
where Pc and Px are the respective expected full prices, and Z represents all of the other determinants of demand. The expected full price of an automobile is 
Competition in the automobile market forces the expected full price of comparable cars to be equal in equilibrium.6 Accordingly, market equilibrium exists when Pc = Pr = P, 
ratio of expected full prices is constant over the short time period of the study, Pc,Px = P, and (2) consumer utility functions are homothetic. Since these assumptions would also lead to the estimation of eq. (14), product differentiation does not alter the empirical results of this article. 7 Equation (9') also presumes that consumers do not anticipate either the beginning or the end of the promotion. In practice, manufacturers usually do not give either dealers or consumers advance knowledge of sales promotion plans. Once they announce a new marketing promotion, manufacturers virtually always specify the expiration date.
where DL, is an additional dummy variable equal to one in the second and all subsequent time periods of the buy-back program. (For example, the first month the buy-back is offered, D, = 1 and DL, = 0; in the second month of the buy-back, both D, = 1 and DL, = 1, and so on.) If there is an information/reaction lag in consumer response to the buy-back, c2 will be nonzero. More specific to the issue at hand, if Chrysler's buy-back program has value to new-car buyers, then cxl + 02 will be strictly positive.
In the resulting induced expectations about the viability of the manufacturer could have affected expected full price. As the firm experiences financial distress, consumers may perceive that less attention is being given to quality control, thereby increasing the probability of drawing a "lemon." Or, as the probability of bankruptcy is increased, consumers may anticipate that the service network will shrink or that parts may not be available. In either case, the expected full price would rise (fall) as the firm is subjected to greater (less) financial distress. In the case of the Chrysler Corporation, consumer perceptions changed over time. Consequently, the impact of financial distress on expected full price should be a function of time, Pc = peY(t). Since the popular press suggested that public opinion became increasingly pessimistic until the loan guarantees were granted and then became increasingly optimistic, we elected to add a quadratic function to equation (10) Equation (14) Table 1 describes the most significant direct-cash rebate programs offered during the time period of this study. Note that only two of 1 As noted by one of the referees, the most appropriate sales data for estimating eq. (14) would be off-the-lot purchases and orders rather than deliveries. To the extent that some deliveries occur in months after the order is taken, delivery data may result in an underestimate of the effect of the change in full price via the buy-back program, rebates, or the public's perception of Chrysler's financial distress. The only other publicly available data on automobile sales is new-car registrations published by Automotive News. Not surprisingly, the estimation of eq. (10) using registration data did not differ qualitatively from the estimation using delivery data. While using delivery data could potentially affect estimates of the effect of the buy-back program and cash rebates, two factors tend to mitigate any bias that might be present. First, the model specification includes a one-month adjustment for lags in consumer response. Only those cars that are delivered at least two months after being ordered go unaccounted for. Second, computation of the dollar value of the buy-back program (Section IV) involves a ratio of the proportionate change in sales during the buyback to the proportionate change in sales during a particular cash rebate. Given the constant elasticity of demand implied by the Cobb-Douglas demand specification, the ratio of proportionate changes will not be affected if the order-to-delivery lag is constant over the relevant time period. the rebates (R2 and R4) extended for more than one month during the sample period (only one month of R3 is contained in the sample period). Equation (14) was estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) and correcting for autocorrelation. The estimation results, which are presented in Table 2 (14) was reestimated without t and t2, and these new estimates are used to examine the effects of the buy-back program and the cash rebates.
The Buy-Back Program
If the buy-back program was effective in increasing the sales of Chrysler relative to its competitors, o1t + 02 should be positive. Table 3 gives the new estimates of ct and 02 after dropping t and t2 from the estimation equation. The estimates of a1 + a2 are positive in all cases, and Table 3 presents the one-tailed tests of significance. Although not significant for compact cars, the estimates support the hypothesis that the buy-back program increased Chrysler's relative sales: for intermediate and full-size cars, consumers did value the lemon protection provided by a thirty-day buy-back program.
The estimates also suggest that there may be a lag in consumer response to the buy-back. Although significant only for intermediates, the positive estimates of 02 suggest that the effect of the buy-back program increased over time. Finally, notice that the magnitude of ctl + c2 increases with the size category of the car. 12 An alternative specification of Chrysler's financial distress was also examined. In eq. (14) the term eY" +2t was replaced with e DTI + T2, where DT1 equals one when consumers expect Chrysler likely to enter bankruptcy (August 1979-May 1980), and DT2 is one once the federal loan guarantees were known (June 1980 on). This alternative specification also failed to provide any empirical evidence that financial distress affected Chrysler's full price. Table 2 -were not as strong as those for the first rebate. As noted earlier, each of these rebates was in effect only for one month during the sample period. The impact of the second rebate was significant for both the compact and intermediate categories. The parameter estimate for 32 was negative but insignificant for full-size cars. The estimated parameters for the third rebate (P3) were all positive as predicted and also significant for both compacts and intermediate size cars.
The Ford rebate had no significant effect on relative sales for any of the size categories. Given this lack of significance, the estimates of the information/reaction lag effect were suppressed (that is, RL4 was set equal to zero for all observations).13 Dropping t and t2 from the estimation had no qualitative effect on estimates for 32, 33, or 34. 
Other Determinants of Demand
While negative in all cases, (1 is significantly negative for full-size cars only, implying that an increase in per-capita income reduces the relative sales of full-size Chryslers. Since X( may be interpreted as the difference between the income elasticities for Chryslers and for other U.S. makers (see eq.
[6]), this estimate is consistent with either a relatively more income-elastic demand for other U.S. automobiles or Chryslers being an inferior good. Although interesting, our estimates cannot distinguish between the two possibilities.
Gasoline prices were a significant determinant of relative sales only for compacts. The negative estimate for 42 implies that the elasticity of demand for Chrysler compacts with respect to gasoline prices is larger in magnitude than that for other U.S. automakers. In the case of intermediates and full-size autos, gasoline prices were not a significant determinant of relative sales. Dropping financial distress from the estimation caused gasoline prices to become significant for full-size cars. Recall that the demand specification in Section II implies constant elasticity of demand with respect to expected full price. Consequently, the elasticity of relative sales with respect to a change in Chrysler's acquisition price (via a cash rebate) equals the elasticity of relative sales with respect to a change in expected maintenance costs (via the buy-back plan). Using subscripts CR and BB to denote the time period of a cash rebate and the buy-back program, it follows that tg t ht the t t ch q Bmeasus ch e in
IV. VALUATION OF CHRYSLER'S LEMON
Noting that the proportionate change in q measures the change in actual sales relative to the level of sales that would have occurred in the absence of either a cash rebate or buy-back plan, equation (15) Table 2 offer no evidence of a time effect, aqtlat is treated as zero, and (Pc)BB/(Pc)CR = 1. That is, prior to the temporary changes induced by either a cash rebate or a buy-back, competition would have equalized full prices.17 To obtain estimates of the value consumers placed on Chrysler's thirtyday lemon insurance, we compared the response to the buy back to the response to Chrysler's August-September 1979 cash rebate.'8 Our methodology was straightforward. We used our estimates of equation (14) with t and t2 omitted to obtain predicted relative sales in the absence of the buy back (qBB) and a rebate (qCR). Then, using actual relative sales data for the buy-back (qBB) and rebate periods (qCR) and setting (APC)cR equal to $400, the value of the lemon insurance was calculated using equation (16). Table 5 presents the estimates and their asymptotic standard errors.19 Given the estimates for ax + cat in Table 3 where tBB is the time period just prior to the buy back (January 1980) and tcR is the time period just prior to the cash rebate. 17 The marginal cost for an automobile is reasonably constant over a given model year.
Widespread contracting for inputs coupled with fixity of production techniques and product design substantially reduce the variability in production costs during the model year. Hence, over a model year-or over seven months of a model year, as will be necessary in our estimation-constant expected full cost is not unreasonable. 18 The August-September rebate was chosen because RI proved to be the most significant of all the rebates (see Table 2 ).
19 To determine the sensitivity of the value estimates to variations in the econometric specification, we considered several alternative models by (1) eliminating the information/ If consumers believe that the increase in maintenance and operating costs for a "large lemon" exceeds the increase for a "small lemon," then it follows that the value of lemon insurance varies directly with the size of the automobile.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE LEMON LAWS
So far we have examined the value to consumers of a thirty-day moneyback guarantee that allowed new-car buyers to return a car for any reason during the first month of ownership. Now we wish to compare the value of this thirty-day buy-back plan to that of a state lemon law that gives the consumer the right to a new car or full refund during the first year of ownership. The two insurance policies are compared along three dimensions of insurance quality: term of coverage, comprehensiveness of coverage, and the transaction costs of using the policy.
First consider term of coverage. To the extent that consumers believe reaction lag (that is, setting DL and RL equal to zero), (2) modifying the specification of Chrysler's financial distress (see note 12 supra), and (3) lagging both Y and G one period. that most major defects occurring in the first year are detectable within the first month of ownership, then, ceterus paribus, consumers will perceive little difference between the thirty-day policy provided by Chrysler and a one-year policy. In the literature concerned with auto lemons, every consumer complaint sufficiently sensational to reach the popular press involved defects that were detected within the first month of ownership.20 Beyond this anecdotal evidence, the opinions of experts within the industry and at the regulatory authorities suggest that most major defects that occur in the first year of ownership are discovered during the first month of ownership, with the notable exception of transmission defects.21 With respect to comprehensiveness of coverage and transaction costs of using a policy, Chrysler's thirty-day buy-back policy unambiguously dominates the one-year state lemon laws. Chrysler's money-back promise covered any complaint while the state lemon laws only cover those defects during the first year that "substantially impair the use and value" of the new car.22 Furthermore, the cost of obtaining relief under state lemon laws is significantly higher than that associated with using the buy-back. Virtually all lemon laws stipulate that the consumer resort to arbitration before a new car is replaced or the money refunded.23 In contrast, the Chrysler plan only required the buyer to inform the dealer of his or her dissatisfaction; Chrysler did not require the buyer to prove that there was anything wrong with the car.
Hence, it seems likely that for most consumers the lemon protection provided by Chrysler's 30-day buy-back plan was viewed as equivalent to (if not better than) the coverage contained in state-provided lemon laws. Consequently, the value estimates presented in Table 5 provide upperbound estimates of the marginal value of state lemon laws.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Using the limited data that are publicly available, this article addresses two questions: (1) do consumers value lemon insurance? and (2) what 20 Obviously those consumer complaints reported in the press will be the most nightmarish ones. Nevertheless, consumer perceptions about the expected cost of buying a lemon are formed in part by the press. Indeed, it is for the very worst cases that consumers most seek lemon protection. Major defects occurring after the express warranty expires can be insured against by buying extended service contracts. 21 Transmission defects have constituted a significant portion of the regulatory concerns. However, these cases involved defects that were detected after the expiration of the warranty. Consequently, these defects would not have been covered by either a thirty-day or a one-year lemon insurance policy. 22 value does the marginal consumer place on lemon insurance? By examining the market's reaction to the Chrysler Corporation's 1980 buy-back program, a thirty-day lemon insurance policy, we find that consumers do value protection against the possibility of buying a lemon. Furthermore, the larger the car, the greater the value placed on lemon protection: estimates for the value of the thirty-day lemon insurance policy to the marginal consumer ranged from $2 for compacts to $138 for intermediates and $218 for full-size automobiles. Since the coverage provided by Chrysler's buy-back plan was more comprehensive than state lemon law coverage, and since the available evidence suggests that most major first-year defects are quickly discovered by new car buyers, the protection provided by the newly created state lemon laws is likely to be less valuable than the protection provided by Chrysler's thirty-day coverage.
Although consumer advocates initially greeted lemon laws with enthusiasm, consumers have not used the new laws extensively. In fact, during the first thirteen months that Connecticut's lemon law was in effect, only forty automobiles were returned out of 113,000 registered.24 The fact that consumers do not frequently use lemon laws and that they place relatively small value on the lemon protection provided by the laws indicates that new-car buyers do not believe it is very likely they will end up with a lemon during the first year of ownership, even if unlucky enough to buy one. One reason that consumers may not place a high value on lemon insurance is that auto makers have substantially upgraded and streamlined their arbitration mechanisms. According to a recent study, "Consumer arbitration mechanisms are now well established in the automobile industry .... For the majority of consumers, automobile industry arbitration has been relatively quick, inexpensive, and informal."25 Because lemon laws require arbitration before allowing consumers to proceed with litigation, it may be the case that the state lemon laws have not provided much relief that was not already available in the marketplace.
